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I. INTRODUCTION 
For 17 years (1990-2007), I was privileged to serve as chief counsel to a 
succession of five members of the National Labor Relations Board 
³%RDUG´1 For more than six of those years, I was Chief Counsel to the 
Chairman.2 From this unique perspective, I had an opportunity to observe 
first-hand the process of decision-PDNLQJXQGHURXUQDWLRQ¶VSULQFLSDOODERU
ODZWKH1DWLRQDO/DERU5HODWLRQV$FW³$FW´3 This Article will address an 
important and controversial aspect of that process²the action of a given 
                                                          
1.   I hold the record in this regard. The members and dates are as follows: John 
Randabaugh (1990-1994); Charles Cohen (1994-1996); John Higgins (1996-1997); 
Peter Hurtgen (1997-2002); Robert Battista (2002-2007). Prior to that service (1975-
1990), I was head of the General CouQVHO¶V'LYLVLRQRI$GYLFH7KDWRIILFHDGYLVHVWKH
General Counsel and Regional Directors on novel and complex legal issues and on 
cases of major national importance. 
2.   I served as Chief Counsel to Chairman Peter J. Hurtgen from 2001 to 2002 and 
Chairman Robert J. Battista from 2002 to 2007.  
3.   See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151±69 (2006) (declaring that 
the U.S. government will protect, inter alia, the right of employees to choose whether to 
unionize or not, under a policy of eliminating obstructions to the free flow of 
commerce).  
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set of Board Members to reverse the precedent of a prior set of Board 
Members.  
Each of these reversals has given rise to howls of protest by the party 
who lost and stout defenses by the party who won. Often, the heat of the 
conflict between the two parties is a measure of the importance of the issue. 
In this Article, I have sought to shed objective light where there has been 
only partisan heat. 
I shall begin, in Part III, with a discussion of the statutory basis for 
reversals. Part IV sets forth the arguments for and against the practice of 
reversing precedent. Part V will then list the most important recent 
reversals. Part VI will categorize these cases according to the basis for 
reversals. Finally, I will set forth my views concerning the circumstances 
under which reversals are appropriate or inappropriate. 
II. BACKGROUND 
As background, I note that the Board is composed of five Board 
Members, one of whom is designated as Chairman.4 Each Member is 
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.5 The 
Members serve for five-year terms.6 Traditionally, the Board is composed 
of three Democrats and two Republicans when the President is a Democrat 
and three Republicans and two Democrats when the President is a 
Republican.7 7KXVLWLVFXVWRPDU\WRVSHDNRID³'HPRFUDWLF%RDUG´DQGD
³5HSXEOLFDQ%RDUG´8 It is not XQXVXDOIRUD³'HPRFUDWLF%RDUG´WRUHYHUVH
LPSRUWDQWSUHFHGHQWVRID³5HSXEOLFDQ %RDUG´DQGYLFH-versa. However, in 
recent years, this practice has increased markedly. This Article will focus 
on these most recent years.   
 
                                                          
4.   See National Labor Relations Act § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (stating 
WKDW³>W@he President shall designate [one of the five members of the Board] to serve as 
&KDLUPDQRIWKH%RDUG´ 
5.   Id. 
6.  Id.  
7.   See ERIC N. WALTENBERG, CHOOSING WHERE TO FIGHT: ORGANIZED LABOR 
AND THE MODERN REGULATORY STATE, 1948-1987, at 19 (2002) (describing the 
SROLWLFDO LGHRORJ\ RI WKH %RDUG DV ³WDFN>LQJ@ EDFN DQG IRUWK    LQ UHVSRQVH WR
presidential appointmeQWV´ 
8.  See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Deadlock is Ending on Labor Board, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/business/01labor.html (assessing the changes that 
are likely to occur to Bush-era Board precedent ZLWK 3UHVLGHQW 2EDPD¶V recess 
appointments of two union lawyers to the NLRB WRFUHDWHD³'HPRFUDWLF%RDUG´). 
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 III. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR REVERSALS 
The Board has wide discretion to interpret the Act as it wishes.9 The Act 
is written in broad statutory terms.10 &RQJUHVV OHIW LW WR WKH %RDUG ³WR
develop and apply fundamental national labor policy . . . . [T]he function of 
striking [the balance between competing interests] is often a difficult and 
delicate responsibility which the Congress committed primarily to the 
[Board]´11 $FRXUWZLOOXSKROGWKH%RDUG¶VSROLF\FKRLFH if LWLV³UDWLRQDO
and consistent with the Act . . . even if [the court] would have formulated a 
GLIIHUHQWUXOHKDG>WKHFRXUW@VDWRQWKH%RDUG´12 In light of this degree of 
discretion, it is to be anticipated that a given Board will not necessarily 
agree with a prior Board. Further, as noted above, Board Members are 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.13 
Given political realitLHV LWPD\EH DQWLFLSDWHG WKDW D³'HPRFUDWLF%RDUG´
PD\GLVDJUHHZLWK WKH SUHFHGHQWV VHW E\ D SULRU ³5HSXEOLFDQ%RDUG´ DQG
vice-versa. As noted above and discussed below, that process has been 
accentuated in recent years.  
                                                          
9.  See NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, ,QW¶O $VV¶Q RI %ULGJH :RUNHUV
(Ironworkers), 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) (noting that Congress delegated the task of 
effectuating labor policy to the Board and its decision-PDNLQJ LV VXEMHFW WR ³OLPLWHG
MXGLFLDOUHYLHZ´see also NLRB v. Ins$JHQWV,QW¶O8QLRQ, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960) 
³:HUHFRJQL]HZLWKRXWKHVLWDWLRQWKHSULPDU\IXQFWLRQDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIWhe Board 
to resolve the conflicting interests that Congress has recognized in its labor 
OHJLVODWLRQ´NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) 
³7KH IXQFWLRQ RI VWULNLQJ WKDW EDODQFH WR HIIHFWXDWH QDWLRQDO ODERU SROLF\ LV RIWHQ D 
difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the 
1DWLRQDO/DERU5HODWLRQV%RDUGVXEMHFWWROLPLWHGMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ´ 
10.   See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ¶QV, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130±32 (1944) 
(reasoning that the Board, as a governmental agency, shall interpret the broad language 
of the Act to effectuate the policy and purposes of the Act), superseded by statute, 
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 137 
(1947), as recognized in, NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968). 
11.  Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500±01 (1978) (citing Truck 
Drivers, 353 U.S. at 96).  
Of course, if the Board acts contrary to a specific provision of the Act, a court will 
properly reverse the Board. See, e.g., H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107±08 
(1970) (reversing both a decision of the Board and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit because, even though the Board has broad powers to enforce the Act, its powers 
do not extend to compelling parties to contract).  
12.   NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (2001) (citations 
omitted).   
13.   See National Labor Relations Act § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006). 
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IV.  ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE PRACTICE OF REVERSING 
PRECEDENT 
A. Arguments For: 
As discussed above, the practice of reversing precedent is consistent 
with, and indeed contemplated by, the broad language of the Act and by the 
appointment process of the Act. Further, a given Board Member is 
appointed with the expectation that she will vote on a case according to her 
conscience and her views as to what is best for national labor policy.14 If 
those views are contrary to extant precedent, it is not unreasonable for the 
Board member to decline to follow the precedent.   
,Q DGGLWLRQ LQGXVWULDO FRQGLWLRQV FDQFKDQJH WKURXJK WLPH DQG WRGD\¶V
economy may be quite different from that of yesterday. Thus, it may be 
prudent to change a precedent that was formulated at a different time under 
different conditions.   
B.   Arguments Against: 
A reversal of precedent results in instability, unpredictability and 
uncertainty in the law. Employers, employees, and unions cannot act in 
reliance on the law, for it may change. What is lawful today may be 
unlawful tomorrow and vice-versa. Further, lawyers run the risk that their 
best advice will have disastrous consequences based on such reliance. 
Finally, our society prides itself on being a nation of laws. Where precedent 
changes simply because a different political group is in power, the public 
becomes cynical about our ideals and disrespectful of the law.  
V.  RECENT REVERSALS OF PRECEDENT 
A.  Brown University  
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that graduate 
assistants who seek a degree at a university are students and not employees 
under the Act.15 In so holding, the Board reversed a contrary policy in New 
York University.16 It is interesting to note that New York University, had 
                                                          
14.   See NLRB v. West Tex Util. Co., 214 F.2d 732, 741 (5th Cir. 1954) (stating 
that the members of the Board are non-SDUWLVDQDQGWKHLUSXUSRVHLVWR³VLWDVMXGJHVWR
hear the issues of fact and to apply the Act in matters of the highest importance to all 
FRQFHUQHG´, denying enf., 106 N.L.R.B. 859 (1953). 
15.   See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004) (diverging from prior Board 
SUHFHGHQWWKDWJUDGXDWHVWXGHQWVIDOOZLWKLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³HPSOR\HH´XQGHU6HFWLRQ
2(3) of the Act, and adopting the view that the collective-bargaining process would be 
counter to the educational process). 
16.   See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205±06 (2000) (finding that even 
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itself reversed a precedent.17 
B.  Harborside Healthcare, Inc.  
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that a pro-union 
supervisory solicitation of union authorization cards from employees was 
inherently coercive, absent mitigating circumstances.18  Under prior law, 
coercion was found only if there was a promise of benefit or threat of 
reprisal.19  
C.  Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia  
In this case, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that 
DQ HPSOR\HU UXOH SURKLELWLQJ ³DEXVLYH DQG SURIDQH´ ODQJXDJH ZDV QRW
unlawful on its face.20 In a prior ruling, the Board had held to the 
contrary.21 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce that prior 
ruling.22 In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, the Board acquiesced to the 
&RXUW¶VYLHZ23 8QGHU WKH%RDUG¶VQHZYLHZ WKH UXle would be unlawful 
only if employees reasonably construed the words as prohibiting Section 7 
activity²³[the right] to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection´24 In addition, the rule is unlawful if the rule was 
discriminatorily motivated, or if the rule was actually applied to Section 7 
                                                          
though graduate assistants were predominantly students, they remained employees 
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act). 
17.   See id. at 1217 (reasoning that physics graduate students who were receiving 
stipends for research were not employees under the Act (citing Leland Stanford, 214 
N.L.R.B. 621 (1974))). 
18.   See Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 906, 906 (2004) (reversing the 
prior law that ³DQH[SOLFLWSURPLVHRIEHQHILWVRU WKUHDWRIUHSULVDO [was necessary] to 
find [the FRQGXFW@REMHFWLRQDEOH´. 
19.   See id. DW  KROGLQJ WKDW VXSHUYLVRUV¶ VROLFLWDWLRQV RI DXWKRUL]DWLRQ FDUGV
were acceptable because they were conducted without threat of reprisal, punishment or 
intimidation (citing Millsboro Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 879, 880 
(1999))). 
20.   Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004). 
21.   See Adtranz, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 291, 293±94 (2000) (holding that the employer 
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a rule that prohibited abusive 
language unless the rule made it clear that the rule was not intended to bar lawful union 
organizing activity), enf. denied, F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
22.   See Adtranz, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 19, 22, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (vacating the 
decision below EHFDXVHWKH%RDUGIDLOHGWRFRQVLGHUWKH3HWLWLRQHU¶VHYLGHQFHDQGFLWHG
no support for its contention that a contrary result could ³FKLOO´ SURWHFWHG DFWLYLW\), 
denying enf., 331 N.L.R.B. 291 (2000). 
23.   See Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. at 647. 
24.   Id. at 648 (citing National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)). 
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activity.25   
D.  Alexandria Clinic, P.A.  
Under Section 8(g) of the Act, a union must give a health care institution 
ten days notice before striking.26 In Alexandria Clinic, P.A., the union gave 
the required notice of day and time, but later delayed the start time for four 
hours.27 No new notice was sent.28 Under Greater New Orleans Artificial 
Kidney Center, WKHUHZRXOGEHQRYLRODWLRQEHFDXVHWKHUHZDV³VXEVWDQWLDO
FRPSOLDQFH´ZLWKWKHWHQ-day rule.29 In Alexandria Clinic, a Board majority 
consisting of three Republicans held that there must be strict adherence to 
the Act, and thus a new ten-day notice was required.30 
E.  Saint Gobain Abrasives, Inc.  
In this case, a Board majority held that an employer is entitled to a 
factual hearing on whether unlawful conduct by the employer caused the 
employees to file a petition to decertify the union.31 Under prior law, the 
Board would presume that there was a causal nexus, and would dismiss the 
petition without a hearing.32 The new rule would result in a dismissal only 
if, after a hearing, a causal nexus was shown.33   
F.  Crown Bolt, Inc.    
Under prior law, an employer threat to close a plant in the event of 
unionization was presumed to have been widely disseminated throughout 
the facility, and this would taint the election process.34 In Crown Bolt, a 
Board majority consisting of three Republicans placed the burden of proof 
                                                          
25.   See id. at 647 (holding that a rule prohibiting abusive language is not a facial 
interference with Section 7 activity (citing Adtranz, 253 F.3d at 22 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
26.   See § 8(g), § 158(g). 
27.   See 339 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1262 (2003), enfd. sub nom. Minn. Licensed Practical 
1XUVHV$VV¶QY. NLRB, 406 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2005).  
28.   Id. 
29.   240 N.L.R.B. 432 (1979). 
30.   See id. at 1263, 1266 (refusing to adopt the precedent of ³substantial 
compliance´). 
31.   See Saint Gobain Abrasives, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 434, 434±35 (2004). 
32.   C.f. id. at 435 (Liebman dissenting) (REMHFWLQJWRWKH%RDUG¶VQHZUXOHEDVHG
on previous law where an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to determine causal 
nexus and that there was a presumption of such nexus (citing Priority One Servs., 331 
N.L.R.B. 1527, 1527 n.2 (2000))). 
33.   See id. at 434 (majority opinion). 
34.   See Springs Indus., 332 N.L.R.B. 40, 40 (2000) (noting that it was WKH%RDUG¶V
traditional position to overturn an election, because of presumed dissemination of the 
most serious threats, such as plant closure). 
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on the union to show such dissemination.35 In doing so, the Board returned 
to the rule of Kokomo Tube Co.36   
G.  IBM Corp.  
In this case, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that 
Weingarten rights37 do not apply to non-unionized employees.38 In so 
holding, the Board reversed the prior holding of Epilespy Foundation.39 
The Board returned to the rule of E.I. Dupont & Co.40 
H.  Oakwood Care Center 
Here, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that the 
employees of an employer (employer A) may not be placed, in a single unit, 
with employees who are jointly employed by A and another employer.41 In 
so holding the Board overruled Sturgis,42 and returned to Greenhoot, Inc.43 
J.  Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. 
In this case a Board majority consisting of three Republicans revised the 
test for determining supervisory status under the Act.44 The decision was 
                                                          
35.   See Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 776, 779 (2004) (deciding to overrule 
Springs Industries and all other decisions that presume dissemination of plant-closure 
threats and requiring the objecting party to prove the dissemination and its impact on 
the election by direct and/or circumstantial evidence). 
36.   See 280 N.L.R.B. 357, 358 (1986). 
37.   See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256±57 (1975) (holding that a 
unionized employee under interrogation by an employer has a right²under Sections 7 
and 8(a)(1) of the Act²upon request, to union representation). 
38.   See IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004) (reasoning that the purpose of 
the Act would be best preserved if the rights recognized in Weingarten do not extend to 
a workplace where, the employees are not represented by a union), enfd. sub nom. 
Schult v. NLRB, No. 04-1225, 2004 WL 259890 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curium). 
39.   See 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 676 (2000), enfd. in part, enf. denied in part, 268 F.3d 
1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Weingarten should be extended to employees in nonunionized 
workplaces to afford them the right to have a coworker present at an investigatory 
interview. Id.  
40.   See E.I. Dupont de Nemours (E.I. Dupont & Co.), 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 630 
(1988) (limiting Weingarten rights to unionized workplaces under the analysis that it 
EHVWHIIHFWXDWHV WKHSXUSRVHVRI WKH$FWDQGDFKLHYHVWKH³IDLUDQGUHDVRQHG´EDODQFH
between the conflicting interests of labor and management). 
41.   See Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 663 (2004) (permitting 
collective bargaining units of solely and jointly employed employees only by consent). 
42.  See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1308 (2000) (rejecting consent 
requirements for such units and adopting a policy that hinges on the presence of a 
³community of interest´). 
43.  See Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973) (holding that a multi-
employer unit is not permitted unless there is a consensual basis for such a unit). 
44.   See Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 686 (2006) (following 
FULWLFLVPRIWKH%RDUG¶VSULRULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6HFWLRQ and refining its analysis of 
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significant, because only employees and not supervisors are protected by 
the Act.45 In general, the Board made it easier to show supervisory status.46 
In revising the test, the Board was influenced by the fact that, in two prior 
decisions, the Supreme Court had disagreed with Board tests under which 
the Board had declined to find supervisory status.47  
K.  Toering Electrical Co. 
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans set forth a new 
requirement for determining that an applicant is an employee entitled to the 
protection of the Act.48 The case arosH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI D ³VDOWLQJ´
campaign, i.e., the process in which a union sends union members to at job 
VLWHZLWKWKHRSHQDQGH[SUHVVSXUSRVHRIXQLRQL]LQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶VZRUN
force at that site.49 Prior to Toering, it was not necessary for the General 
Counsel to establish prima facie that the union member was genuinely 
interested in seeking to establish an employment relationship.50 Under 
Toering, that fact EHFRPHVDQHFHVVDU\SDUWRIWKH*HQHUDO&RXQVHO¶VSULPD
facie case.51 
                                                          
assessing supervisory status (citing NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706 
(2001))). 
45.   See 348 N.L.R.B. at 687 (explaining that supervisors are excluded from the 
$FW¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI ³HPSOR\HH´ DIWHU &RQJUHVV DPHQGHG WKH $FW to include Section 
2(11) in response to WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ WKDW KHOG WKDW VXSHUYLVRUV ZHUH
employees for purposes of Section 2(3) (citing Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 
U.S. 485 (1947))).  
46.   See id. at 688±89 (reasoning that because the putative supervisors practiced 
independent judgment and regularly delegated tasks to subordinate employees, such as 
nurses assistants, registered nurses are considered supervisory and thus not covered 
under the Act). 
47.   See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706, 706 (2001), DII¶J, 193 F.3d 
444 (6th 1999). Persons DUH VXSHUYLVRUV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH $FW ³LI  WKH\ KROG WKH
authority to engage in any [one] of the [twelve] listed supervisory functions, (2) their 
µH[HUFLVHRIVXFKDXWKRULW\ LVQRWDPHUHO\ URXWLQHRUFOHULFDOQDWXUHEXW UHTXLUHV WKH
use of independent judgment.¶ DQG  WKHLU DXWKRULW\ LV KHOG µLQ WKH LQWHUHVW RI WKe 
employer.¶´ Id. (quoting NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 
573±74 (1994)).  
48.   Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 225, 234 (2007). 
49.   See id. at 225 Q GHILQLQJ VDOWLQJ DV ³WKH DFW RI D WUDGH XQLRQ LQ VHQGLQJ D
union member or members to an unorganized jobsite to obtain employment and then 
organize the employees´LQWHUQDOTXRWDWLRQPDUNVRPLWWHGciting Tualatin Elec., 312 
N.L.R.B. 129, 130 n.3 (1993))).  
50.   See, e.g., Progressive Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 538, 551±53 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (uSKROGLQJWKH1/5%¶VGHFLVLRQby rationalizing that it was not necessary to first 
show that the union member was trying to seek an employment relationship before 
finding that the employer had engaged in an unfair labor practice by failing to consider 
to hire a group of union members), enfg., Progressive Elec., Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 426 
(2005).  
51.   See Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 231 (requiring that the General Counsel 
prove that the union member who is claiming an unfair labor practice first prove that 
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L.  Register-Guard 
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans ruled, inter alia, that in 
order to show employer discrimination in the administration of a computer-
use policy, the General Counsel must show that the employer engaged in 
disparate treatment of similar activity, i.e., the employer permitted some of 
these activities and prohibited others simply because of the Section 7 nature 
of the latter.52 )RU H[DPSOH DQ HPSOR\HU FRXOG GUDZ D OLQH ³EHWZHHQ
charitable solicitations and non-charitable solicitations, between 
solicitations of a personal nature . . . and solicitation for the commercial 
sale of a product . . . between solicitation and mere talk, and between 
business-related use and non business-UHODWHG XVH´53 In each of these 
examples, WKH%RDUGKHOGWKDW³the fact that union solicitation would fall on 
the prohibited side of the line [would] not establish´ unlawful 
discrimination.54 In reaching this conclusion, the Board overruled Fleming 
Co.55 and Guardian Industries Corp.56  
M.  Anheuser-Busch, Inc.  
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that employer 
discipline imposed after an unlawful Weingarten interrogation was 
nonetheless legal.57 The employer interrogated an employee without 
observing the requirements of Weingarten.58 The employer thereby gleaned 
evidence that the employee had engaged in misconduct, and the employer 
disciplined the employee for this misconduct.59 Under some prior law the 
discipline would be unlawful because it was based on evidence that was 
                                                          
she was legitimately seeking employment). 
52.   Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1118 (2007) (placing the burden on the 
General Counsel when proving discrimination to show such disparate treatment), enfd. 
in part, enf. denied in part, remanded sub nom. *XDUG3XEO¶J&RY1/5%)G
53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
53.   Id.  
54.   Id. Of course, if the employer was motivated by the desire to assure that the 
union solicitations would be on the prohibited side of the line, that would be unlawful.   
55.   338 N.L.R.B. 192 (2001), enf. denied, 349 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 1995). 
56.   313 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1994), enfd. in part, enf. denied in part, 49 F.3d 317 (7th 
1995) 2Q UHYLHZ WKH '& &LUFXLW GHQLHG HQIRUFHPHQW RI WKH %RDUG¶V GHFLVLRQ in 
Register-Guard on the ground that the employer did not actually show the distinctions 
VXJJHVWHGE\WKH%RDUG*XDUG3XEO¶J&RY1/5%)G, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2009).   
57.   Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560, 560 (2004), enfd. in part, enf. denied 
in part sub nom. Brewers and Maltsters, Local Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 36 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
58.   See id. at 561. 
59.   See id. at 562 n.9 (stating that the discipline imposed on sixteen employees was 
for unprotected conduct that was in clear violation of plant rules and regulations).  
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unlawfully gathered.60 However, under conflicting precedent, the Board 
had upheld the discipline on the ground that it was for cause.61 The Board 
majority in Anheuser-Busch overruled Tocco62 and Great Western,63 
applied Taracorp,64 and thereby upheld the discipline despite the fact that 
the employee was not allowed to be accompanied by a union 
representative.65 
N.  St. George Warehouse  
In discriminatory discharge cases, the dischargee has the duty to mitigate 
damages, i.e., to search for interim work and thereby reduce the back pay 
award.66 Prior to St. George, the Board placed on the employer the burden 
of going forward with evidence to show that there was substantially 
equivalent work in the area and that the employee failed to seek it.67 In St. 
George, the Board majority consisting of three Republicans placed on the 
General Counsel the duty to show affirmatively that the employee searched 
for relevant work.68 
O.  Dana Corp. 
Under Keller Plastics, the Board held that where an employer has 
voluntarily and legally recognized a union as the representative of 
employees WKH XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\ VWDWXV FRXOG QRW EH TXHVWLRQHG IRU D
                                                          
60.   See Tocco, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 480, 480 (1997). 
61.   See Taracorp, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984) (overruling prior decisions such as 
Kraft Foods, 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980) and refusing to award reinstatement and 
backpay to an employee despite Weingarten violations, reasoning that doing so would 
violate the policy of the Act and would constitute bad policy).  
62.   323 N.L.R.B. 480. 
63.   Great Western Produce Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (1986), enfd. 839 F.2d 555 
(9th Cir. 1988). 
64.   273 N.L.R.B. 221. 
65.   Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560, 561 (2004), ), enfd. in part, enf. 
denied in part sub nom. Brewers and Maltsters, Local Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 
36 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
66.   See, e.g., NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 174 n.3 (2d Cir. 1965) 
³,WLVDFFHSWHGE\WKH%RDUGDQGUHYLHZLQJFRXUWVWKDWDGLVFULPLQDWHe is not entitled to 
back pay to the extent that he fails to remain in the labor market, refuses to accept 
equivalent employment, fails diligently to search for alternative work, or voluntarily 
quits alternative employment without good reason´), enf. 140 N.L.R.B. 1710 (1964). 
67.   E.g., Woonsocket Health Ctr., 263 N.L.R.B. 1367, 1370 (1982) (stating that the 
³EXUGHQ LVRQ WKH UHVSRQGHQW WRGHPRQVWUDWH   EDFNSD\ OLDEOLW\´; Steve Aloi Ford, 
Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 661, 662 (1971) (noting that even though the General Counsel was 
not required to produce an employee for examination, the Trial Examiner should have 
examined witnesses and reviewed evidence in order to render her decision).  
68.   St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. 961, 961 (2007). 
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reasonable period of time.69 In Dana, the Board majority consisting of three 
Republicans imposed additional requirements.70 The parties must give 
notice to employees that recognition has occurred and that employees can 
file petitions, within forty-five days, seeking an election to decertify the 
recognized union or to select another union.71 If such a petition is filed, an 
election will be held.72  
P.  Tru-Serv Corp.  
Under prior law, an employer settlement of an unfair labor practice case 
that contained a recognition clause would result in the dismissal of a 
decertification petition, where the alleged unlawful conduct occurred prior 
to the petition.73 In Tru-Serv, a Board majority consisting of three 
Republicans held that the decertification petition and election could still be 
held, absent an admission of a violation by the employer in the settlement 
agreement.74 In so ruling, the Board returned to the rule of Passavant.75 
Q.  MV Transportation  
Under prior law, where a successor employer recognized the union 
UHSUHVHQWLQJ WKH SUHGHFHVVRU¶V HPSOR\HHV WKH XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\ VWDWXV
would not be challenged for a reasonable period of time.76  In MV 
Transportation, a Board majority of three Republicans and two Democrats 
ruled that the union was not entitled to such immunity.77 The reasonable 
period of time was deemed to have expired under the predecessor.78 In so 
                                                          
69.   Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586 (1966). 
70.   Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 435 (2007) PRGLI\LQJ WKH %RDUG¶V H[WDQW
SUHFHGHQW ³>L@Q RUGHU WR DFKLHYH D µILQHU EDODQFH¶ RI LQWHUHVWV WKDW EHWWHU SURWHFWV
HPSOR\HHV¶IUHHFKRLFH´. 
71.   Id. 
72.   Id. 
73.   See Douglas-Randall, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 431, 431 (1995) (affirming the 
dismissal of a petition on the grounds that the showing of interest was tainted by the 
employeU¶VXQIDLUODERUSUDFWLFHV 
74.   Truserv Corp., 349 N.L.R.B. 227, 227 (2007). 
75.   See id. at 228 (returning to the rule of prior precedent²a settlement agreement 
FDQQRWEHFRQVWUXHGDVDQDGPLVVLRQWKDW WKHHPSOR\HU¶VDFWLRQVFRQVWLWXWHGDQXQIDLU
labor practice, unless an admission is an express part of the agreement (citing Passavant 
Health Ctr., 278 N.L.R.B. 483 (1986))).  
76.   See St. Elizabeth Manor, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 341, 341 (1996) (holding that once 
a successor employer recognizes an incumbent union, ³the union is entitled to a 
reasonable period of time for bargaining without challenge WRLWVPDMRULW\VWDWXV´).  
77.   See MV Transp., 337 N.L.R.B. 770, 770 (2002) (reverting to a standard where 
WKHXQLRQ¶VSUHVXPSWLRQRIPDMRULW\VWDWXVZLWK the successor employer is rebuttable). 
78.   Id.   
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ruling, the Board returned to the rule of Southern Moldings.79   
R.  Allegheny Ludlum II 
Under prior law, an employer had to obtain explicit employee consent if 
the employer wished to include images of the employee in an anti-union 
campaign video.80 The Board applied this rule in Allegheny Ludlum I.81 The 
D.C. Circuit denied enforcement because the act of seeking consent might 
itself be unlawful interrogation under Section 8(1)(a).82 On remand, a 
Board majority of three Republicans and two Democrats held that the 
employer can make a general announcement which discloses that the 
pictures will be used, that participation is voluntary, that participation will 
not result in a benefit and that non-participation will not result in reprisal.83 
The pictures can then be used in the video, provided that the atmosphere is 
free from unfair labor practices.84 
S. BE & K Construction Co. II 
In BE & K Construction I, the Board dealt with a completed lawsuit that 
an employer had lost.85 The Board held that the lawsuit was unlawful if it 
was filed for an illegal motive.86 On review, the Supreme Court remanded 
for the Board to determine whether the lawsuit was nonetheless reasonably 
based and, if so, whether that would preclude the finding of a violation.87 
                                                          
79.   See id. (holding that unless the successor employer adopts the existing contract, 
a union only has a rebuttable presumption of continuing majority status (citing S. 
Moldings, 219 N.L.R.B. 119, 119±20 (1975))). 
80.   See Sony Corp. of Am., 313 N.L.R.B. 420, 420 (1993) (upholding the finding 
of the Administrative Law Judge that photographing employees and including their 
photographs in an anti-union video without their informed consent constitutes an unfair 
labor practice under the Act).   
81.   See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. (Allegheny Ludlum I), 320 N.L.R.B. 484, 484 
(1995), enf. denied in part, enfd. in part, 104 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
82.   See Alleghany Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354, 1363±64 (D.C. Cir. 
1997), denying enf. in part, enfg. in part, Allegheny Ludlum I, 320 N.L.R.B. 484 
(1995). 
83.   See Alleghany Ludlum Corp. (Alleghany Ludlum II), 333 N.L.R.B. 743, 745 
(2001) (clarifying when employers may lawfully include visual images of employees in 
campaign presentations), enfd., 301 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2002). 
84.   See id. at 745 (specifying that an employer may not, however, lawfully include 
HPSOR\HHLPDJHVZKHUHWKHYLGHRWHQGVWRLQGLFDWHWKDWHPSOR\HH¶VSRVLWLRQRQXQLRQ
representation, withouWWKHHPSOR\HH¶VFRQVHQW 
85.   See BE & K Constr. Co. (BE & K I), 329 N.L.R.B. 717, 717±18 (1999), enfd., 
246 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2001), UHY¶G, 536 U.S. 516 (2002). 
86.   See id. at 726 (holding that the identical claims brought by the company lacked 
merit and had a retaliatory motive in violation of Section 8(a)(1)). 
87.  See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 536 (2002) (invalidating the 
%RDUG¶VVWDQGDUGIRULPSRVLQJOLDELOLW\XQGHUWKH$FWWRSHQDOL]HDQ\UHDVRQDEO\EDVHG
yet unsuccessful, suits filed with retaliatory purpose). 
80 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 1:1 
On remand, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that the 
suit was reasonably based and that a reasonable lawsuit could not be 
condemned as unlawful, even if it was motivated by anti-union 
considerations.88 
T.  Levitz Furniture Co.  
In this case, the Board majority held that an employer could unilaterally 
withdraw recognition from a union only upon a showing that the union had 
actually lost majority status.89 Prior to that, the Board had said that the 
employer could unilaterally withdraw recognition from a union upon a 
showing that there was reasonable good-faith doubt of majority status.90  
In LevitzWKH%RDUGZDVLQIOXHQFHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ
Allentown Mack v. NLRB.91 In that case, the Court had expressed 
misgivings about the Board having a single standard for withdrawal of 
recognition, the filing of a petition, and employer polling.92 However, the 
&RXUWXSKHOGWKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQLQWKLVUHJDUG93  
VI. CATEGORIZING THE REVERSALS: COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this Part, I will categorize the above reversals, and I will then make 
comments and reach conclusions as to the propriety of reversal for each 
category. 
                                                          
88.   See BE & K Constr. Co. (BE & K II), 351 N.L.R.B. 451, 459 (2007) (adopting 
a standard that requires more than just circumstantial proof of retaliatory motive 
(quoting BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 451, 539 (2002) (Souter, J., 
concurring))). 
89.   See Levitz Furniture Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2001). 
90.   See, e.g., Celanese  Corp. of Am., 95 N.R.L.B. 664, 674 (1951) (concluding 
that in light of the totality of the circumstances, the employer was not required to avail 
LWVHOI RI LWV ULJKW WR ILOH D SHWLWLRQ ZLWK WKH %RDUG WR DVFHUWDLQ WKH 8QLRQ¶V DFWXDO
representative status in order to demonstrate its good faith).  
91.   See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 717 (DFTXLHVFLQJWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
decision in Allentown Mack LQRUGHU WR³DYRLGWKHFRQIXVLRQRYHU WHUPLQRORJ\   LQ
>DSSO\LQJ@ WKH JRRG IDLWK GRXEW VWDQGDUG´ (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. 
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 365±66, 373±74  (1998))).  
92.   See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 365±66, 373±74  
(1998) DOORZLQJDQHPSOR\HU WR DFWZKHQ LW KDV ³UHDVRQDEOHXQFHUWDLQW\´RIXQLRQ¶V
majority status).  
93.  See id. DW  REVHUYLQJ WKDW WKH %RDUG¶V VLQJOH VWDQGDUG IRU SROOLQJ DQG
withdrawals RI UHFRJQLWLRQ LV D ³puzzling policy,´ EXW not so puzzling as to be 
³DUELWUDU\ RU FDSULFLRXV´ Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 717 (holding that an 
employer may only withdraw recognition when the incumbent union has lost the 
VXSSRUWRIDPDMRULW\RIHPSOR\HHVDQGSURSRVHVWKDW³DQHPSOR\HUFDQGefeat a post-
ZLWKGUDZDOUHIXVDOWREDUJDLQDOOHJDWLRQLILWVKRZVDVDGHIHQVHWKHXQLRQ¶VDFWXDOORVV
RIPDMRULW\VWDWXV´.  
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A. Acquiescing to Adverse Court Precedent 
As discussed above, some of the reversals are because of adverse court 
precedent. In a situation where the Board loses before a circuit court, the 
Board has three options: it can seek certiorari in that case;94 it can adhere to 
the rejected precedent in another case and seek a favorable result in a 
different circuit;95 or it can acquiesce to the view of the adverse court 
decision and make that the new position of the Board. Only the latter 
involves a reversal of precedent.  
In cases where a circuit court has disagreed with Board precedent, it may 
EH UHDVRQDEOH DQG SUXGHQW WR DGRSW WKH FRXUW¶V YLHZ SDUWLFXODUO\ LI WKH
court has a sound basis for its view. This becomes even more compelling if 
the Board loses in circuit after circuit. Of course, it may also be reasonable 
for the Board to stick to its guns. ,QP\YLHZ WKH%RDUG¶VFKRLFHVKRXOG
turn on the importance of the issues to national labor policy. 
 B.  Sharing the Misgivings of a Court  
As discussed above, there are cases where the reviewing court has 
H[SUHVVHG PLVJLYLQJV DERXW WKH %RDUG¶V SRVLWLRQ EXW XOWLPDWHO\ XSKROGV
the position of the Board as within WKH%RDUG¶V discretion.96 In these cases 
WKH%RDUGPD\FRPHWRVKDUHWKHFRXUW¶VPLVJLYLQJVDQG WKXVRYHUUXOHLWV
own precedent.97   
In cases where a court has simply expressed misgivings about a Board 
position, it would seem that the Board can reasonably adhere to its position 
particularly when no other court has expressed such misgivings. However, 
in doing so, the Board may wish to set forth its reasons for not sharing the 
misgivings of the one court. 
                                                          
94.   See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322, 326 (1974) 
(reversing a Sixth Circuit decision and upholding the N/5%¶VLQLWLDOGHFLVLRQEHFDXVH
WKH%RDUG¶VUXOLQJZDVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKthe right of employees embodied in Section 7 of 
the Act). 
95.   If the Board prevails in another circuit, there would be a conflict of circuits, 
thereby enhancing the prospects for Supreme Court review. This is what occurred with 
favorable results in NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).  
96.   See Alleghany Ludlum v. N.L.R.B., 104 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(noting that the D.C. Circuit ZLOOVHWDVLGHWKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLon only when the Board 
KDV³DFWHGDUELWUDULO\RURWKHUZLVHHUUHGLQDSSO\LQJHVWDEOLVKHGODZWRWKHIDFWV´FLWLQJ
,QW¶O8QLRQRI(OHF (Electronic Workers) v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 1532, 1536±37 (D.C. Cir. 
1994))), denying enf. in part, enfg. in part, Allegheny Ludlum I, 320 N.L.R.B. 484 
(1995). 
97.   C.f. Oakwood Healthcare Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 687, 687±88 (2006) 
(changing Board precedent to coincide with warnings received in two different cases 
from the Supreme Court that the Board ZDV FRQVWUXLQJ ³VXSHUYLVRU\ VWDWXV´ WRR
narrowly). 
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 C. Conflict in Board Precedents 
As also discussed above, there are some cases where there is a conflict in 
WKH%RDUG¶VSUHFHGHQW98 In that situation, the Board can adopt one line of 
cases and overrule the other or it can overrule both and adopt a third view. 
:KHUH WKHUH LVDFRQIOLFW LQ WKH%RDUG¶VSUHFHGHQWVDQG WKH\FDQQRWEH
reconciled, the Board has little choice but to overrule one line and adopt the 
other, or overrule both and adopt a third line.  
 D. Restoring an Older Precedent  
As discussed above, there are cases where the Board reverses precedent 
in order to return to an even older precedent.99 In those cases, the Board can 
claim that it is simply restoring the law to what it once was.100  
If the original precedent lasted for many years without court disapproval, 
it may be reasonable to reverse the recent precedent and return to the prior 
one. However, in doing so, there is a danger that a subsequent Board may 
reverse it again. The ping-pong match and the instability would continue. 
7KHEHVWUHVXOWLVIRUWKH%RDUGWRIUDQNO\DFNQRZOHGJHWKHSUR¶VDQGFRQ¶V
of each approach, conclude, on balance, why one is better than the other, 
and express the hope that this will finally settle the matter. 
E. Opting for a Different Rule 
Finally, as discussed above, there are cases where the Board simply 
concludes, on its own, that the precedent does not make sense and opts for 
a different rule.101 In these cases²where none of the elements set forth in 
A through D above are present²the Board simply disagrees with the 
precedent of a prior Board.102 As stated at the outset, changes like these 
lead to instability, unpredictability, and disrespect for the law. Thus, in my 
view, the burden is on the reversing Board to justify the change.  
                                                          
98.   See, e.g., Alleghany Ludlum  )G DW  GHWHUPLQLQJ WKDW WKH%RDUG¶V
SUHFHGHQWV UHJDUGLQJ ³SROOLQJ´ YLGHRWDSLQJ, DQG IUHH VSHHFK FUHDWHG ³FRQIOLFWLQJ
PDQGDWHV´DQGUHPDQGLQJIRUUHVROXWLRQ 
99.   E.g., Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 776, 776 (2004) (abandoning the 
precedent of Springs Industries and adopting the prior precedent established in Kokomo 
Tube Co. requiring that an objecting party must prove the impact on the election by 
direct and circumstantial evidence).  
The chain of reversals may go back even further.  Trying to resolve who made the 
ILUVWFKDQJHLVDELWOLNHWU\LQJWRGHWHUPLQH³ZKRVWDUWHGLW´LQDVFKRRO-yard fight. 
100.  See, e.g., Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 489±  VWDWLQJ WKDW ³WKH
concerns expressed by the Board in 6W&ODLUH¶V+RVSLWDO [twenty-five] years ago are 
just as relevant today´ 
101.  E.g., Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 228 (2007) (grounding WKH%RDUG¶V 
decision in statutory policy). 
102.  See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 644 (2007). 
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Ideally, one would hope for empirical data showing that the precedent 
has had undesirable economic consequences or has had results that are 
inconsistent with the policies of the Act. However, under Section 4(a) of 
WKH$FWWKH%RDUGLVIRUELGGHQWRKLUHVWDIISHUVRQVWRSHUIRUP³HFRQRPLF
DQDO\VLV´103 Notwithstanding this, there is nothing to preclude the Board 
from relying on academic or other studies, or to receive and rely upon 
Brandeis briefs. Absent such empirical support, it is my view that the 
Board should be reluctant to reverse precedent in this situation.  
                                                          
103.  See 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). 
